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A PENNSYLVANIA ROAD CONSTRUCTION PROJECT COMPLETED:
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN PENNSYLVANIA
CLARIFIED AS A TWO-WAY STREET IN
GILLARD v. AIG INSURANCE CO.
ANDREW J. HUBLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Like most people who have driven on the Pennsylvania Turnpike, you
have probably encountered road construction delays.1 Indeed, the Pennsylvania Turnpike has been under some type of construction project since
1940.2 While the purpose of many road construction projects is to promote safety and convenience, they often cause feelings of anger, frustration, and confusion.3 Additionally, the long-term nature of many road
construction projects, coupled with the pipeline of upcoming projects,
can make drivers feel that Pennsylvania will never complete construction
on its roads.4
* J.D. Candidate 2013, Villanova University School of Law; B.S. 2005, Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech). I would like to thank
my wife, Christine Hubley, for her continuous support. Additionally, I would like
to thank the members of Volume 57 of the Villanova Law Review for their helpful
feedback and comments on this article.
1. See generally PennDOT Road Construction Season Under Way, WPXI.COM (Pittsburgh), Apr. 4, 2011, http://www.wpxi.com/news/27422803/detail.html (noting
several projects under way in 2011 and that each year there are many accidents in
Pennsylvania due to road construction); Jon Schmitz, Pennsylvania’s $300 Million
Construction Season Begins in Earnest Today, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 22,
2010, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/10081/1044670-147.stm (discussing beginning of “construction season” in Pennsylvania and that PennDOT was planning to
spend $300 million on road work in Allegheny County alone).
2. See Through Seven Decades: A Brief History of the PA Turnpike, PA. TURNPIKE,
http://www.paturnpike.com/geninfo/70th_anniversary/turnpike70Years.aspx
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (reviewing various expansions of turnpike by decade,
beginning with 1940s); see also Construction Schedule, PA. TURNPIKE, http://www.
paturnpike.com/improve/conschedule.aspx (last modified Mar. 30, 2012) (listing
current road construction projects on Pennsylvania Turnpike).
3. See Through Seven Decades: A Brief History of the PA Turnpike, supra note 2
(stating that in expansion of highway during 2000s, “utmost attention has been
given to the drivers’ safety and comfort”); see also I’m Tired of Road Construction
on Rt. 80 in Pennsylvania, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=
2395426050 (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (expressing frustration with road construction on I-80 in Pennsylvania as illustrated by users creating Facebook group).
4. See generally PA. TURNPIKE COMM’N, ENHANCED FY 2012 TEN YEAR CAPITAL
PLAN PROJECT LISTING (2011), available at http://www.paturnpike.com/geninfo/
2012_Capital_Plan.pdf (showing, broken down by construction project, amount
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For more than a century, Pennsylvania has been dealing with another
type of “road” construction project: determining whether the attorney-client privilege is a one-way street—protecting only client-to-attorney communications—or a two-way street—protecting communications flowing in
both directions.5 Conflicting decisions among Pennsylvania courts have
caused confusion for practitioners regarding the scope of the attorneyclient privilege.6 In 2010, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did little to
alleviate the confusion when it issued a divided opinion in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fleming.7 In the aftermath of Fleming, which held that
the attorney-client privilege was a one-way street, the supreme court
granted the appeal in Gillard v. AIG Insurance Co.8 to determine the scope
of the state’s attorney-client privilege.9 In Gillard, the court stated that this
disagreement among Pennsylvania courts most likely arose from the “combudgeted by Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission for fiscal years 2012 through
2021). The plan is over nine pages long and budgets nearly six billion dollars for
road construction projects alone. See id. Further, the Pennsylvania Turnpike
Commission forecasts that many of the projects labeled “Roadway/Safety” will require at least two fiscal years to complete. See id.
5. The attorney-client privilege was codified in 1887. Act of May 23, 1887,
§ 5(d), 1887 Pa. Laws 158, 159 (codified as amended at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5928
(2011). Since 1887, courts in Pennsylvania have issued conflicting decisions on its
scope, in particular whether it protects both client-to-attorney and attorney-to-client communications. Compare Nat’l Bank of W. Grove v. Earle, 46 A. 268, 269 (Pa.
1900) (holding attorney-client privilege protects attorney’s communication to client), and Sedat, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 641 A.2d 1243, 1245 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1994) (holding attorney-client privilege protects legal advice given by attorney to
client), with Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fleming, 924 A.2d 1259, 1264 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2007) (holding attorney-client privilege protects attorney-to-client communications only if those communications would reveal confidential communications
originating with client), aff’d on other grounds, 992 A.2d 65 (Pa. 2010) (per curiam),
and Gocial v. Independence Blue Cross, 827 A.2d 1216, 1222 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)
(holding attorney-client privilege only protects communications from client-toattorney).
6. See Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44, 56 (Pa. 2011) (stating court decided
to hear appeal to clarify scope of attorney-client privilege).
7. 992 A.2d 65 (Pa. 2010) (per curiam). The superior court based its decision
in Fleming on the notion that the attorney-client privilege is a one-way street protecting only client-to-attorney communications. See Fleming, 924 A.2d at 1264 (interpreting attorney-client privilege narrowly). The superior court did note,
however, that attorney-to-client communications are protected if they would reveal
the confidential communications. See id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
granted the appeal and, in a divided 2-2 opinion, affirmed the superior court’s
ruling. See Fleming, 992 A.2d at 65 (affirming Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s
narrow interpretation of attorney-client privilege). The opinion in support of affirmance found that the privilege had been waived and thus declined to decide the
case on the merits. See id. at 70 (Eakin, J., in support of affirmance). However, the
opinion in support of reversal argued for a more “pragmatic approach” to the
privilege, similar to the Pennsylvania supreme court’s decision in Earle. See id. at 73
(Saylor, J., in support of reversal).
8. 15 A.3d 44 (Pa. 2011).
9. See id. at 46 (explaining court’s purpose for granting appeal). In Gillard,
the superior court affirmed the decision of the court of common pleas, holding
the attorney-client privilege applies only to client-to-attorney communications. See
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peting interests-of-justice factors in play.”10 Further, the court reasoned
that it could not give plain meaning to the language of the attorney-client
privilege statute and also achieve its intended purpose.11 The dissent,
however, cautioned that a broad construction of the privilege creates the
potential for abuse.12 Nevertheless, the majority held that the attorneyclient privilege in Pennsylvania is a two-way street protecting both client-toattorney and attorney-to-client communications.13
This Note argues that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reached
the correct result in Gillard.14 Part II provides a general overview of the
attorney-client privilege, from its adoption through its present-day application in other jurisdictions.15 Part III discusses the history of the privilege
in Pennsylvania.16 Part IV examines the Pennsylvania supreme court’s reasoning and analysis in Gillard.17 Part V argues that the court had the authority to define the scope of the attorney-client privilege in the
Commonwealth.18 Finally, Part VI asserts that the court’s decision is consistent with the privilege’s intended purpose and that current limitations
are sufficient to prevent future abuse of the privilege.19
II. PAVING

WAY: THE GENERAL HISTORY
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

THE

OF THE

In order to understand the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision
in Gillard, it is essential to consider the history of the attorney-client priviGillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 836, 836 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (unpublished table
decision), rev’d, 15 A.3d 44.
10. Gillard, 15 A.3d at 57 (noting strong tension between goal of encouraging
candid communications between attorney and client and ability of litigants to have
full access to evidence).
11. See id. at 58 (implying expanded view of attorney-client privilege is required to fulfill its intended purpose).
12. See id. at 60 (Eakin, J., dissenting) (claiming broad attorney-client privilege could deny fact finder access to information that might be critical to claim).
The majority, however, stated that the current procedures and practices in place
are sufficient to protect from any potential abuse. See id. at 58 (majority opinion).
For a further discussion of the current limitations to the attorney-client privilege in
Pennsylvania, see infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
13. See Gillard, 15 A.3d at 59 (holding attorney-client privilege covers attorneyto-client communications to extent necessary to provide legal advice).
14. For an analysis of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Gillard,
see infra notes 125-99 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the general history of the attorney-client privilege, see
infra notes 20-51 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the history of the attorney-client privilege in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 52-80 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the supreme court’s reasoning and analysis in Gillard,
see infra notes 81-124 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the authority of the supreme court to define the scope
of the attorney-client privilege, see infra notes 125-55 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the outcome of the Gillard decision and its impact
moving forward, see infra notes 156-99 and accompanying text.
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lege.20 The privilege traces a long road back to Elizabethan England, and
possibly even ancient Rome.21 The United States has recognized the attorney-client privilege since at least the nineteenth century.22 This long
road has not been smooth, but it paved the way and set the stage for the
Pennsylvania supreme court’s decision in Gillard.23
A.

The Beginning of the Road: Origins of the Attorney-Client Privilege

Like the Pennsylvania Turnpike among America’s roadways, the attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest evidentiary privileges and has been
recognized in English law since at least the Elizabethan Era.24 In fact, the
privilege may even trace its origins as far back as the Roman Empire.25
The original purpose of the privilege was to prevent an “unethical act of
betrayal” by the attorney against the client.26 To prevent such unethical
acts, courts prohibited attorneys from revealing information that clients
communicated to their attorneys in confidence.27 However, when courts
20. For a discussion of the history of the attorney-client privilege, see infra
notes 24-51 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the origins of the attorney-client privilege and its transition to the modern privilege, see infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the history of the attorney-client privilege in the
United States, see infra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the need for clarity in courts’ interpretations of the
attorney-client privilege, see infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
24. See In re Selser, 105 A.2d 395, 403 (N.J. 1954) (noting attorney-client privilege was recognized in England in 1577, but stating it may have been recognized as
early as 1280); Edward J. Imwinkelried & Andrew Amoroso, The Application of the
Attorney-Client Privilege to Interactions Among Clients, Attorneys, and Experts in the Age of
Consultants: The Need For a More Precise, Fundamental Analysis, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 265,
266-67 (2011) (providing that English cases recognized attorney-client privilege as
early as 1577, but that some commentators disagree about date privilege became
“fully formed”). See generally James A. Gardner, A Re-evaluation of the Attorney-Client
Privilege (Part I), 8 VILL. L. REV. 279, 286-303 (1963) (discussing general history of
attorney-client privilege, including its origins in English common law).
25. See Gardner, supra note 24, at 289-90 (noting privilege may have origins in
Roman law, but that connection cannot be definitively proven). During the Roman Era, the law prohibited servants from providing testimony against their masters. See id. at 289. Further, Roman law did not permit “advocates” to be called to
testify against their clients during a case. See id. at 290. Although it is likely impossible to prove that these rules were the foundation of the attorney-client privilege
in English law, they might have had some influence. See id.
26. Imwinkelried & Amoroso, supra note 24, at 267; accord Daniel R. Fischel,
Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) (stating original purpose
for attorney-client privilege was to protect attorney’s honor); Melanie B. Leslie, The
Costs of Confidentiality and the Purpose of Privilege, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 31, 48 (same).
27. See Fischel, supra note 26, at 2 (noting clients that wish to hide information will be less likely to hire attorneys). When the privilege was developed in
England, parties were not able to testify on their own behalf; thus, negative disclosures were released only if someone else testified against them. See id. When the
privilege first developed, society viewed an attorneys as “a man of business and the
obedient servant of the [client].” Gardner, supra note 24, at 289. While attorneys
were not servants in the classic English sense, they were not considered gentlemen.
See id. Nevertheless, attorneys experienced a “powerful feeling that a servant must
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first recognized the privilege, it “belonged” to attorneys, who had the
power to waive it “as [they] saw fit.”28 Further, despite its seemingly noble
purpose, courts did not universally accept the attorney-client privilege,
with some courts even rejecting privilege claims because they prevented
discovery of the truth.29
Over time, the original purpose of the attorney-client privilege fell
out of favor and a new justification emerged that helped entrench the
privilege in modern law.30 This new justification reasoned that without
protection from disclosure, clients would not fully disclose matters to their
attorneys; thus, attorneys would not be able to adequately represent their
clients.31 This change had a significant impact on the attorney-client privilege, as it shifted from an attorney-centric privilege to a client-centric
one.32
Today, the privilege remains extremely important and is often considered the most revered of all the evidentiary privileges.33 Nevertheless, the
privilege is not without limits.34 Additionally, some critics have even
keep his master’s secrets,” creating an ethical duty prohibiting attorneys from revealing their clients’ communications. See id.
28. Gardner, supra note 24, at 289.
29. See Leslie, supra note 26, at 48 (noting that courts did not universally
adopt privilege and disputed its purpose until nineteenth century); cf. Gardner,
supra note 24, at 291 (discussing change in justification for attorney-client privilege
beyond attorney loyalty to client).
30. See Imwinkelried & Amoroso, supra note 24, at 267 (discussing emergence
of “instrumental rationale” for attorney-client privilege, which American courts
have adopted); Leslie, supra note 26, at 49 (noting by twentieth century, “instrumental justification” that client should be “ ‘free[ ] of apprehension in consulting
his legal adviser’ ” replaced “ ‘honor’ justification” (quoting 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290,
at 3194 (1905))).
31. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The privilege
recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such
advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.”);
Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court, 219 P.3d 736, 740 (Cal. 2009) (stating
purpose of privilege is to “ ‘promote full and open discussion’ ” (quoting Mitchell
v. Superior Court, 691 P.2d 642, 646 (Cal. 1984))); Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client
Privilege: Continuing Confusion About Attorney Communications, Drafts, Pre-existing Documents, and the Source of the Facts Communicated, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 967, 969 (1999)
(stating “simple” rationale for attorney-client privilege is that client will be “more
open and candid” when assured that attorney will not disclose their
communications).
32. See generally Gardner, supra note 24, at 290-92 (discussing change from
eighteenth-century view of privilege based on attorneys’ duty of loyalty to more
modern approach focused on ensuring clients’ confidence in their attorneys).
33. See In re Search Warrant B-21778, 521 A.2d 422, 440 (Pa. 1987) (referring
to attorney-client privilege as “time honored”); Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511
A.2d 1327, 1333 (Pa. 1986) (stating attorney-client privilege is “most revered of our
common law privileges”); Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 691 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1976) (noting attorney-client privilege is oldest testimonial privilege).
34. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 31, at 970 (noting attorney-client privilege protects communications from disclosure, but does not protect underlying facts). For
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claimed that it only benefits the legal profession, not society or clients.35
Despite these criticisms, the attorney-client privilege has become a critical
component of the legal system and is recognized by the U.S. Supreme
Court and all fifty states.36
B.

Driving on the Right: The Modern Attorney-Client Privilege
in the United States

In the United States, evidentiary privileges, such as the attorney-client
privilege, serve as exceptions to the presumption that most evidence is
a further discussion of the limits of the attorney-client privilege, see infra notes
178-79 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 26, at 3, 33 (arguing attorney-client privilege
should be abolished because it is beneficial to attorneys, but not clients). Fischel
stated that the privilege provides attorneys a competitive advantage over other professionals, such as accountants, which increases the demand for legal services. See
id. at 4-5. Further, he argued that the privilege causes attorneys representing opposing parties to undertake duplicative efforts in litigation, which only serves to
“funnel” more money to attorneys. See id. at 7. Additionally, he claimed that the
privilege harms clients as a class because litigation is a “zero-sum game” and the
benefits to one client will negatively impact another. See id. at 16-17. Thus, Fischel
concluded society would be better off without the attorney-client privilege and that
it should be abolished. See id. at 33. But see Gardner, supra note 24, at 304-05
(refuting Jeremy Bentham’s attack on attorney-client privilege).
Bentham criticized the privilege and argued that it only protects the guilty
because the innocent person does not fear disclosure of his communication. See
id. at 304. However, Gardner stated that “Bentham obviously oversimplified the
matter.” Id. at 305. Further, Gardner noted that most of the legal profession embraces the privilege. See id.
36. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (recognizing attorney-client privilege as part of
U.S. law as interpreted by U.S. courts); see also Lynch v. Hamrick, 968 So. 2d 11, 1415 (Ala. 2007) (noting attorney-client privilege is part of law in Alabama); Langdon v. Champion, 752 P.2d 999, 1001-02 (Alaska 1988) (stating Alaska attorneyclient privilege protects advice that renders legal services); Buell v. Superior Court,
391 P.2d 919, 923 (Ariz. 1964) (noting Arizona legislature has codified attorneyclient privilege); Holt v. McCastlain, 182 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Ark. 2004) (recognizing
attorney-client privilege is part of Arkansas Rules of Evidence); Costco Wholesale
Corp., 219 P.3d at 742 (stating attorney-client privilege in California protects communications between client and attorney); Alliance Constr. Solutions, Inc. v. Dep’t
of Corr., 54 P.3d 861, 869 (Colo. 2002) (recognizing Colorado attorney-client privilege protects communications between contractor of government entity and that
entity’s attorney); Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equip. Corp., 757 A.2d 14, 22
(Conn. 2000) (stating Connecticut Supreme Court has emphasized importance of
attorney-client privilege in Connecticut); Moyer v. Moyer, 602 A.2d 68, 72 (Del.
1992) (recognizing attorney-client privilege protects communication between client and attorney in Delaware); Am. Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So. 2d 1249, 1252-53
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (emphasizing importance of attorney-client privilege, but
stating crime-fraud exception exists in Florida); Zielinski v. Clorox Co., 504 S.E.2d
683, 685 (Ga. 1998) (noting party claiming attorney-client privilege in Georgia has
burden to show it applies); State v. Wong, 40 P.3d 914, 921 (Haw. 2002) (noting
attorney-client privilege in Hawaii is codified in Hawaii Rules of Evidence); Skelton
v. Spencer, 565 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Idaho 1977) (noting attorney-client privilege in
Idaho is “a defensive shield and not an offensive sword”); Consolidation Coal Co.
v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 257 (Ill. 1982) (limiting attorney-client privilege in Illinois for corporate clients); Hayworth v. Schilli Leasing, Inc., 669 N.E.2d
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165, 169 (Ind. 1996) (noting scope of attorney-client privilege in Indiana); Brandon v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 681 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Iowa 2004) (noting attorneyclient privilege is recognized in Iowa by common law and statute); State v. Gonzalez, 234 P.3d 1, 10 (Kan. 2010) (stating attorney-client privilege in Kansas is statutory); 3M Co. v. Engle, 328 S.W.3d 184, 188 (Ky. 2010) (noting attorney-client
privilege in Kentucky is part of Kentucky Rules of Evidence); State v. Green, 493
So. 2d 1178, 1179 (La. 1986) (recognizing existence of attorney-client privilege
statute in Louisiana); Rich v. Fuller, 666 A.2d 71, 74 (Me. 1995) (recognizing attorney-client privilege in Maine); Greenberg v. State, 26 A.3d 955, 959 (Md. 2011)
(noting attorney-client privilege is statutory in Maryland); Darius v. City of Boston,
741 N.E.2d 52, 55 (Mass. 2001) (noting clients can waive attorney-client privilege
in Massachusetts); In re Estate of Dalton, 78 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Mich. 1956) (determining whether attorney-client privilege covers information received by attorney
from third party in Michigan); Kahl v. Minn. Wood Specialty, Inc., 277 N.W.2d
395, 398 (Minn. 1979) (noting attorney-client privilege in Minnesota was codified
in 1851); Flowers v. State, 601 So. 2d 828, 831 (Miss. 1992) (noting Mississippi
recognizes attorney-client privilege in Mississippi Rules of Evidence); State ex rel.
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (noting
Missouri legislature has codified attorney-client privilege in recognition of common law); State v. Statczar, 743 P.2d 606, 610 (Mont. 1987) (stating attorney-client
privilege in Montana is codified); State v. Spidell, 233 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Neb.
1975) (recognizing attorney-client privilege is statutory in Nebraska); Molina v.
State, 87 P.3d 533, 539 (Nev. 2004) (noting attorney-client privilege is codified in
Nevada); Riddle Spring Realty Co. v. State, 220 A.2d 751, 754 (N.H. 1966) (recognizing existence of attorney-client privilege in New Hampshire); In re Selser, 105
A.2d 395, 403 (N.J. 1954) (stating attorney-client privilege in New Jersey is part of
state’s common law); State v. Valdez, 618 P.2d 1234, 1236 (N.M. 1980) (stating
New Mexico attorney-client privilege is defined by New Mexico Rules of Evidence);
Hoopes v. Carota, 543 N.E.2d 73, 73 (N.Y. 1989) (recognizing attorney-client privilege in New York); State v. McIntosh, 444 S.E.2d 438, 441 (N.C. 1994) (noting
attorney-client privilege is “well-established” in North Carolina); State v. Red Paint,
311 N.W.2d 182, 184 (N.D. 1981) (explaining requirements for attorney-client
privilege under North Dakota Rules of Evidence); State ex rel. Nix v. City of Cleveland, 700 N.E.2d 12, 16 (Ohio 1998) (recognizing attorney-client privilege in Ohio
protects communication between attorneys and their clients); Chandler v. Denton,
741 P.2d 855, 865 (Okla. 1987) (noting requirements for attorney-client privilege
in Oklahoma); Goldsborough v. Eagle Crest Partners, Ltd., 838 P.2d 1069, 1071-72
(Or. 1992) (explaining Oregon attorney-client privilege as stated in Oregon Evidence Code); Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44, 58 (Pa. 2011) (stating attorneyclient privilege is two-way street in Pennsylvania); Rosati v. Kuzman, 660 A.2d 263,
265 (R.I. 1995) (noting requirements for asserting attorney-client privilege in
Rhode Island); State v. Doster, 284 S.E.2d 218, 219 (S.C. 1981) (stating “attorneyclient privilege has long been recognized” in South Carolina); State v. Catch the
Bear, 352 N.W.2d 640, 645 (S.D. 1984) (noting requirements for applying attorney-client privilege in South Dakota); State v. Buford, 216 S.W.3d 323, 326 (Tenn.
2007) (stating attorney-client privilege in Tennessee is codified in statute, but also
recognized in common law); In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218,
223 (Tex. 2004) (recognizing attorney-client privilege in Texas); Gold Standard,
Inc. v. Am. Barrick Res. Corp., 801 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1990) (stating attorneyclient privilege in Utah is codified); Steinfeld v. Dworkin, 515 A.2d 1051, 1051 (Vt.
1986) (per curiam) (recognizing attorney-client privilege in Vermont); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 370 S.E.2d 296, 301 (Va. 1988) (noting requirements of attorney-client privilege in Virginia); Soter v. Cowles Publ’g Co., 174 P.3d 60, 75-76
(Wash. 2007) (en banc) (recognizing attorney-client privilege in Washington);
State ex rel. Brison v. Kaufman, 584 S.E.2d 480, 488 (W. Va. 2003) (noting West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure protects what is covered by traditional attorneyclient privilege); Jax v. Jax, 243 N.W.2d 831, 835 (Wis. 1976) (stating privilege is
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generally admissible.37 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized some
form of the attorney-client privilege since at least the nineteenth century.38 The Supreme Court’s decision in Hunt v. Blackburn39 recognized
that the attorney-client privilege was necessary to aid lawyers in adequately
assisting their clients.40 Further, other federal courts noted that the social
benefits obtained from the attorney-client privilege overcome any harm
inflicted by the suppression of the evidence.41
The modern attorney-client privilege, as the Restatement (Third) of Law
Governing Lawyers summarizes, involves “(1) a communication (2) made
between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client.”42 This definition ensures that clients are able to speak to lawyers about their legal issues
without fear of disclosure.43 Also, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified its
view of the attorney-client privilege in Upjohn Co. v. United States.44 In
Upjohn, the Court asserted that if “the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with
some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be pro-

codified in Wisconsin); Trusky v. State, 7 P.3d 5, 9 (Wyo. 2000) (recognizing attorney-client privilege in Wyoming).
37. See Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862 (3d
Cir. 1994) (stating evidentiary privileges are exceptions to general rule that evidence is admissible); see also Commonwealth v. Stewart, 690 A.2d 195, 197 (Pa.
1997) (“ ‘[E]xceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for
truth.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Hutchison v. Luddy, 606 A.2d 905, 908
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992))).
38. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (noting attorney-client
privilege exists and that it protects communications between client and attorney).
39. 128 U.S. 464 (1888).
40. See id. at 470 (explaining that purpose of privilege is to relieve client’s
apprehension so that attorney can provide client adequate assistance). However,
the Court noted that the privilege “is that of the client alone, and no rule prohibits
the latter from divulging his own secrets.” Id.
41. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358
(D. Mass. 1950) (stating attorney-client privilege is necessary for “ ‘administration
of justice’ ” (quoting Hunt, 128 U.S. at 470)).
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000) (listing
general requirements for satisfaction of attorney-client privilege under Restatement); see also id. § 68 cmt. a (stating § 68 is intended to represent the “general
formulation of the attorney-client testimonial privilege”); id. § 68 cmt. c (acknowledging that privilege is intended to protect clients, not attorneys).
43. See Gregory C. Sisk & Pamela J. Abbate, The Dynamic Attorney-Client Privilege, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 201, 217 (2010) (stating § 68 “succinctly” sets out
elements for modern attorney-client privilege). Sisk and Abbate asserted that the
privilege allows clients to communicate freely with their legal counsel. See id. They
also noted it is the client reaching out for legal advice from the attorney that “triggers the privilege.” Id.
44. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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tected.”45 Attempts to construe the privilege narrowly, however, have
caused confusion and inconsistency in its application.46
Despite the call for clarity, courts have failed to interpret the attorneyclient privilege consistently.47 In particular, it is unclear whether the privi45. Id. at 393. Upjohn was a pharmaceutical company that discovered, during
an independent audit, that one of its subsidiaries was making payments to foreign
government officials in exchange for business. See id. at 386. The company conducted an internal investigation, during which its attorneys sent a questionnaire to
several of its managers inquiring about potentially illegal payments made to foreign governments. See id. at 386-87. The managers were told to treat the questionnaire as “highly confidential” and not to disclose its content. See id. at 387.
The company voluntarily reported the questionable payments to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). See
id. The IRS began an investigation and requested, among other things, the questionnaires sent to Upjohn’s managers. See id. at 387-88. The company refused to
produce the questionnaires, claiming they were protected under the attorney-client privilege. See id. at 388. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals found the privilege did not protect the questionnaires from disclosure.
See id. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that if the privilege were construed broadly,
upper management could hide “unpleasant facts and create too broad a ‘zone of
silence.’ ” Id.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the long history of the
attorney-client privilege and its purpose to “ ‘encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.’ ” Id. at 389 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
403 (1976)). The Court discussed the “control group test” used by the Sixth Circuit, which examines whether, in a corporate context, “ ‘the employee making the
communication . . . is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a
decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the
attorney.’ ” Id. at 390 (quoting City of Phila. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F.
Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962)). If the employee was in such a position, then the
attorney-client privilege would apply. See id.
The Court held that the “control group test . . . frustrates the very purpose of
the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation.” Id. at 392. Further, the Court stated there must be a “degree of certainty”
regarding whether communications will be protected in order for the privilege to
function properly. Id. at 393. For those reasons, the Court found the attorneyclient privilege protected the questionnaires. See id. at 396-97.
46. See Grace M. Giesel, The Legal Advice Requirement of the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Special Problem for In-House Counsel and Outside Attorneys Representing Corporations, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1169, 1174 (1997) (asserting that “narrow parameters”
adopted by courts construing attorney-client privilege creates “confusion, inconsistency and uncertainty”). Giesel argued that if clients are unsure whether their
communications will be protected, “the efficacy of the privilege as an encourager
of candor diminishes.” Id. at 1173.
47. See id. at 1173-74 (discussing courts’ inconsistency in applying requirement that communication “relate to the obtaining or rendering of legal advice,
service, or assistance, and the related professional legal capacity requirement”); see
also Rice, supra note 31, at 973-76 (noting that some jurisdictions have adopted
derivative protection of attorney-to-client communications, while others have extended protection to all communication). See generally Sisk & Abbate, supra note
43, at 239-40 (arguing that to ensure lawyers and clients are able to freely communicate, scope of attorney-client privilege must be dynamic and not construed
narrowly).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-2\VLR204.txt

366

unknown

Seq: 10

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

6-AUG-12

12:34

[Vol. 57: p. 357

lege applies to communications from attorneys to their clients.48 At least
one commentator has argued that protecting attorney-to-client communications will “extend[ ] the privilege’s protection far beyond what is necessary to further its limited goal.”49 However, the Third Circuit noted two
reasons that support protecting the “two-way application”: (1) it prevents
the use of an attorney’s statements to infer a confidential communication
by a client; and (2) “legal advice given to the client should remain confidential.”50 Despite these fundamental disagreements, many jurisdictions
have adopted at least some protection for attorney-to-client
communications.51
48. See Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 A.2d 1327, 1337 (Pa. 1986) (stating
attorney-client privilege is limited to communications from client to attorney); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fleming, 924 A.2d 1259, 1264 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)
(same), aff’d on other grounds, 992 A.2d 65 (Pa. 2010) (per curiam). But see In re
Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating attorney-client privilege protects attorney communications that involve confidential communication from client to attorney); Byrd v. State, 929 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Ark. 1996) (providing that
attorney-client privilege protects communications by attorney and client to each
other); Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court, 219 P.3d 736, 742 (Cal. 2009)
(same).
49. Rice, supra note 31, at 974. Rice claimed that there is “no apparent reason” why clients would disclose less if the attorney-client privilege did not protect
attorney-to-client communication. Id. Further, he asserted that judges have expanded the privilege for two reasons: (1) most attorney communications will reveal
some content of the client’s prior communications; and (2) it eliminates the requirement to prove two separate instances of the privilege. See id. at 976. However, he argued that judges have undertaken this “haphazard transformation”
without considering all of the relevant implications. See id. at 1005. But, in conclusion, Rice stated that because the privilege is part of the common law, the “change,
for better or for worse, will likely continue on a case-by-case basis.” Id.
50. United States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 986 (3d Cir. 1980).
Amerada Hess involved lawsuits filed by the SEC and IRS against three corporations
for potential improper treatment of foreign payments on their tax returns. See id.
at 982. In the course of the investigation against Amerada Hess, the IRS sought
production of a list of employees interviewed by Amerada Hess’s outside legal
counsel. See id. at 985. Amerada Hess claimed the attorney-client privilege, but the
trial court found they were not protected because the privilege did not apply to
attorney-to-client communication and the list was, in general, not privileged. See
id.
The Third Circuit noted that federal courts have found that the attorney-client
privilege covers “[l]egal advice or opinion from an attorney to his client.” Id. at
986. Thus, the court determined that the trial court was incorrect to conclude that
the privilege does not apply to attorney-to-client communications. See id. However, the court agreed with the trial court that a simple list of employees interviewed by outside counsel is not the kind of communication that the privilege
covers. See id.
51. See, e.g., id. at 986 (stating legal advice from attorney has been long protected under attorney-client privilege in federal courts); Byrd, 929 S.W.2d at 154
(noting privilege protects statements made by both attorney and client); Spectrum
Sys. Int’l Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (N.Y. 1991) (providing that
attorney-client privilege protects attorney-to-client communications made for purpose of providing legal advice to client).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol57/iss2/4

10

Hubley: A Pennsylvania Road Construction Project Completed: The Attorney\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-2\VLR204.txt

2012]

unknown

Seq: 11

6-AUG-12

NOTE

III. A LONG-TERM CONSTRUCTION PROJECT: THE HISTORY
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN PENNSYLVANIA

12:34

367
OF THE

Pennsylvania recognized the attorney-client privilege even before the
founding of the United States.52 Additionally, the General Assembly of
Pennsylvania (General Assembly) codified the privilege in the nineteenth
century and again in the mid-twentieth century.53 Despite the General
Assembly’s best intentions, the courts of the Commonwealth were unable
to agree on the scope of the privilege.54 These disagreements turned the
attorney-client privilege into a long term “construction project” that created confusion within the Pennsylvania legal community.55
A.

Laying Down the Groundwork: Adoption and Statutory
Codification in Pennsylvania

The attorney-client privilege has been a part of the law of Pennsylvania since its founding as a colony in 1681.56 In 1887, the General
Assembly passed a statute codifying the privilege in the Commonwealth.57
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has long recognized the
importance of the privilege in ensuring candid attorney-client communications.58 In Pennsylvania, the privilege is intended to protect the client,
and it is the client’s right to assert the privilege.59 The Pennsylvania su52. For a discussion of the initial recognition of the attorney-client privilege
in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
53. For a discussion of the statutory codification of the attorney-client privilege in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
54. For a discussion of the disagreement among Pennsylvania courts regarding the scope of the attorney-client privilege, see infra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
55. For a discussion of the confusion created by the disagreement among
Pennsylvania courts, see infra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
56. See Gocial v. Independence Blue Cross, 827 A.2d 1216, 1221 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2003) (noting that Pennsylvania has recognized attorney-client privilege since
colony’s founding); Commonwealth v. Noll, 662 A.2d 1123, 1126 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (“The attorney-client privilege has been part of Pennsylvania law since the
founding of the Pennsylvania colony . . . .”).
57. Act of May 23, 1887, § 5(d), 1887 Pa. Laws 158, 159 (codified as amended
at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5928 (2011)). The 1887 statute stated: “Nor shall counsel
be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made to him
by his client, or the client be compelled to disclose the same, unless in either case
this privilege be waived upon the trial by the client.” Id. Further, the statute essentially codified the common law principle. See Eisenman v. Hornberger, 44 Pa. D. &
C.2d 128, 129 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1967) (discussing attorney-client privilege statute).
58. See Nat’l Bank of W. Grove v. Earle, 46 A. 268, 269 (Pa. 1900) (“If the
secrets of the professional relation can be extorted from counsel . . . by the antagonist of his client, the client will exercise common prudence by avoiding counsel.”);
Beltzhoover v. Blackstock, 3 Watts 20, 28 (Pa. 1834) (“Without such a privilege the
confidence between client and advocate, so essential to the administration of justice, would be at an end.”).
59. See Appeal of McNulty, 19 A. 936, 938 (Pa. 1890) (“It is the privilege of the
client to object, and not of a stranger, even if the testimony objected to was a
privileged communication.”); Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 691

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-2\VLR204.txt

368

unknown

Seq: 12

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

6-AUG-12

12:34

[Vol. 57: p. 357

preme court further emphasized this client-centric approach by placing
the burden on the party seeking disclosure to show that the disclosure
would not violate the privilege.60
Reaffirming the importance of the attorney-client privilege, the General Assembly re-codified the privilege for both civil and criminal actions
in 1976.61 The statute for civil actions states, “In a civil matter counsel
shall not be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made to him by his client, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose the same, unless in either case this privilege is waived upon the trial
by the client.”62 To determine whether the statutory requirements are
met, several Pennsylvania courts adopted a four-part test, which appears to
limit the privilege to client communications to their attorneys.63 However, not all Pennsylvania courts applied this test.64
Shortly after the statute’s re-codification, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania noted “that the privilege is not concerned with
prejudice [or] the better ascertainment of the truth[,] . . . [but rather] its
purpose is to foster a confidence between client and advocate that will
lead to a trusting and open attorney-client dialogue.”65 Furthering the
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (implying privilege, after eighteenth century, was intended
to protect clients); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 213 A.2d 223, 226 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1965) (noting attorney-client privilege is client’s right to assert).
60. See Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 A.2d 1327, 1334 (Pa. 1986) (providing that party seeking disclosure of information has burden of proving lack of
violation of attorney-client privilege); Moore v. Bray, 10 Pa. 519, 524-25 (Pa. 1849)
(“The general rule is, that all professional communications are sacred. If the particular case form an exception, it must be shown by him who would withdraw the
seal of secrecy, and, I think, should be clearly shown.”); Brennan v. Brennan, 422
A.2d 510, 515 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (noting party seeking disclosure has burden of
proof).
61. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5916 (2011) (codifying attorney-client privilege in
Pennsylvania for criminal matters); id. § 5928 (codifying privilege for civil
matters).
62. Id. § 5928.
63. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mrozek, 657 A.2d 997, 998 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (stating four general requirements are necessary to protect communications
under attorney-client privilege). The four requirements are:
1) The asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client.
2) The person to whom the communication was made is a member of
the bar of a court, or his subordinate.
3) The communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed by his client, without the presence of strangers, for the purpose of
securing either an opinion of law, legal services or assistance in a legal
matter, and not for the purpose of committing a crime or tort.
4) The privilege has been claimed and is not waived by the client.
Id.
64. See, e.g., Slusaw v. Hoffman, 861 A.2d 269, 273 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (allowing for derivative protection for attorney-to-client communications to extent
such communications would disclose confidential information originally communicated by client).
65. Estate of Kofsky, 409 A.2d 1358, 1362 (Pa. 1979) (citations omitted). The
court noted that the language of the statute “makes it clear that the statute pros-
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cause, the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct state that an attorney cannot reveal confidential communications without the client’s consent.66 However, the privilege is not without limitations, which often must
be addressed based on the facts of each case.67
B.

Causing a Traffic Jam: Disagreement Regarding the Scope of the AttorneyClient Privilege Among Pennsylvania Courts

Pennsylvania courts have been interpreting the scope of the attorneyclient privilege since its original statutory codification in the nineteenth
century.68 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s 1900 decision in National
Bank of West Grove v. Earle69 stated that courts cannot force attorneys to
disclose advice that they provided to their clients.70 This early interpretacribes not only giving evidentiary consideration to confidential communications,
but also their very disclosure.” Id. Thus, the damage occurs when the confidence
for open communication between attorney and client is broken and “not when the
evidence is given substantive consideration.” Id.
66. See PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2004) (“A lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to
carry out the representation . . . .”). Comment 2 to Rule 1.6 states that clients need
to be able to “communicate fully and frankly” with their attorneys. Id. R. 1.6 cmt.
2. Additionally, comment 3 to the Rule notes “[a] lawyer may not disclose [confidential client communications] except as authorized or required by the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law.” Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 3.
67. See In re Search Warrant B-21778, 521 A.2d 422, 428 (Pa. 1987) (noting
court must consider facts of individual cases to determine whether privilege is
properly invoked).
68. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 A.2d 1327, 1334 (Pa. 1986) (explaining that party seeking disclosure of information has burden of proof to show
no violation of attorney-client privilege); Alexander v. Queen, 97 A. 1063, 1064
(Pa. 1916) (holding attorney-client privilege protects communications between attorney and client even if “ ‘a professional person may deem [them] unimportant to
the controversy’ ” (quoting Moore v. Bray, 10 Pa. 519, 524 (Pa. 1849))); Nat’l Bank
of W. Grove v. Earle, 46 A. 268, 269 (Pa. 1900) (finding attorney-client privilege
applied to legal advice given by attorney to his client); Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab
Co., 357 A.2d 689, 692 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (determining attorney-client privilege
does not prevent testimony of client’s attorney where “the client’s rights or interests cannot be adversely affected thereby”); Commonwealth v. Brown, 175 A. 748,
756 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1934) (concluding attorney-client privilege protects attorney
communications to client).
69. 46 A. 268 (Pa. 1900).
70. See id. at 269 (holding attorney-client privilege protected advice from attorney-to-client). Earle involved settling the debts of a decedent who owned most
of the stock in a publishing company. See id. at 268-69. National Bank was a creditor of the decedent and had agreed to a plan with several of the decedent’s other
creditors, by which the decedent’s unsecured creditors were to receive repayment.
See id. at 268. Earle and another defendant were the proposed managers for the
plan, but they were also trustees for two of the decedent’s other creditors. See id.
The plaintiff filed suit, alleging that the defendants had personal interests in
the plan and had acted in bad faith. See id. at 269. The plaintiff sought the removal of the defendants and their answers “to certain interrogatories,” and the
defendants denied any wrongdoing or bad faith. See id. The court dismissed the
case as it related to the two trustees. See id. Importantly, the court stated that it
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tion established a protection of attorney-to-client communications; however, in subsequent cases regarding the scope of the privilege,
Pennsylvania courts largely ignored the decision.71
Over time, many courts in Pennsylvania adopted a narrower construction of the privilege that protects client-to-attorney communication, but
not attorney-to-client communication.72 Nevertheless, not all Pennsylvania courts adopted this narrow standard; instead, some adopted a derivative construction protecting attorney-to-client communication that
would reveal previous communications made by the client to the attorney.73 Additionally, several Pennsylvania decisions went even further and
afforded full protection under the statute to attorney-to-client
communications.74
These conflicting decisions created confusion in the Commonwealth
about whether the attorney-client privilege is a proverbial one-way or twoway street.75 In 2007, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed this
confusion in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fleming.76 In an evenly
would be improper to obtain discovery from the attorney, because if discovery were
allowed, “then a man about to become involved in complicated business affairs,
whereby he would incur grave responsibilities, should run away from a lawyer
rather than consult him.” Id.
71. See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of the Ass’n of Corporate Counsel et al. in
Support of Reversal at 13, Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44 (Pa. 2011) (No. 10
EAP 2010), 2010 WL 4969915 [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief of the Ass’n of Corporate Counsel et al.] (criticizing superior court’s decision in Fleming for failing to
discuss or mention Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Earle). But see
Gillard, 15 A.3d at 55-56 (noting appellant did not cite Earle “as a legitimate reconciliation” of broad interpretation of attorney-client privilege statute).
72. See, e.g., Maguigan, 511 A.2d at 1337 (stating attorney-client privilege only
protects communications from client to attorney for purpose of obtaining legal
advice); Commonwealth v. Hetzel, 822 A.2d 747, 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (same);
Eisenman v. Hornberger, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 128, 129 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1967)
(same).
73. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fleming, 924 A.2d 1259, 1264 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2007) (finding attorney-client privilege statute protects attorney-to-client communications that would “reveal confidential communications from the client”),
aff’d on other grounds, 992 A.2d 65 (Pa. 2010) (per curiam); Slusaw v. Hoffman, 861
A.2d 269, 273 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (same).
74. See Alexander v. Queen, 97 A. 1063, 1064 (Pa. 1916) (recognizing that
“ ‘all professional communications are sacred’ ” (quoting Moore v. Bray, 10 Pa. 519,
524 (Pa. 1849))); Sedat, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 641 A.2d 1243, 1245 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1994) (explaining that attorney-client privilege protects legal advice
provided by attorneys to clients); Commonwealth v. Brown, 175 A. 748, 756 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1934) (same).
75. See Gillard, 15 A.3d at 56 (acknowledging that Pennsylvania courts have
not consistently interpreted scope of attorney-client privilege).
76. See Fleming, 992 A.2d at 67 (Eakin, J., in support of affirmance) (noting
purpose of appeal was to determine whether superior court erred in determining
attorney-client privilege was one-way street). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
addressed whether the attorney-client privilege protected a document prepared by
Nationwide’s general counsel and sent to “officers, managers, and three other attorneys.” See id. at 65-66. Nationwide originally brought suit against several former
employees for accessing policy-holder information and providing it to competitors.
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divided decision, the court found that the appellants waived the privilege
and—because it was equally divided—affirmed the superior court’s decision without addressing the scope of the privilege.77 The justices supporting reversal of the superior court’s decision asserted that the court should
have adopted the more “pragmatic approach” from Earle because the standard in place caused confusion and was difficult to apply.78 This split decision did little to clear up the confusion among the Pennsylvania legal
community.79 However, shortly after Fleming, the Pennsylvania supreme
court accepted the appeal in Gillard to clarify the scope of the attorneyclient privilege in the Commonwealth.80

See id. at 65. The employees brought a counter-claim stating that Nationwide filed
the suit in bad faith. See id. The employees sought the document because it “contain[ed] counsel’s assessment of the agent defections and [Nationwide’s] strategy
underlying the lawsuits.” Id. at 66.
77. See id. at 69-70 (finding appellants waived privilege by disclosing attorneyclient communications to third party). The opinion in support of affirmance
noted that Nationwide previously disclosed two other documents that discussed a
similar subject matter and never claimed those documents were privileged. See id.
at 68. Because the court determined that all three documents were of a similar
subject matter, it held that Nationwide waived any attorney-client privilege. See id.
Thus, the two justices in favor of affirmance declined to decide the case on the
merits. See id. at 70.
78. See id. at 72-74 (Saylor, J., opinion in support of reversal) (disagreeing
with two justices in favor of affirmance that Nationwide waived attorney-client privilege because it disclosed two other documents of similar nature). Justice Saylor
and Chief Justice Castille agreed the documents dealt with the same subject matter, but found they were not similar when closely examined. See id. at 71. The
justices noted the two documents disclosed were an e-mail that stated the basic
understanding of the reasons for the former employees’ defections and a manual
that detailed the practices Nationwide should follow when employees defect. See
id. at 70-71.
The justices further agreed that the document contained confidential client
communications. See id. at 71. However, they also agreed with amici curiae that
the superior court’s decision in Fleming “ ‘poses inordinate practical difficulties’
that make it administratively and judicially unworkable.” See id. at 73 (quoting
AMICI Curiae Brief of the Ass’n of Corporate Counsel et al., supra note 71, at 19.
The justices concluded that there was “unavoidable intertwining” of communications between an attorney and a client, and thus the court should follow the “pragmatic approach” of Earle. See id. at 73. Thus, Justice Saylor and Chief Justice
Castille stated they would have reversed the decision of the superior court. See id.
at 74.
79. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Supreme Court Leaves in Limbo Applicability of AttorneyClient Privilege to Communications from Attorney to Client, LITIG. LAWFLASH (Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP, Phila., Pa.), Mar. 9, 2010, available at http://www.morgan
lewis.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publication.detail/publicationID/d412f9b4-34
1d-4bca-b22d-c2d64254269f (noting Pennsylvania supreme court affirmed superior
court’s “controversial” decision in Fleming, but also noting supreme court could
resolve confusion by hearing Gillard appeal).
80. See Gillard, 15 A.3d at 46 (“In this appeal, we consider whether, and to
what degree, the attorney-client privilege attaches to attorney-to-client
communications.”).
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NEW

In Gillard, the plaintiff attempted to obtain documents from AIG that
involved communications from AIG’s outside counsel to its claim representatives.81 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania decided that Pennsylvania’s attorney-client privilege statute did not cover those
communications.82 However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the superior court’s decision over two dissenting justices, and held
that the attorney-client privilege is a two-way street.83
A.

Facts and Procedure

The Pennsylvania supreme court accepted the appeal in Gillard to determine whether the attorney-client privilege protects attorney-to-client
communications in Pennsylvania.84 The case arose from a bad faith suit
involving AIG’s handling of an uninsured motorist claim.85 During discovery, Gillard requested all relevant documents from the law firm representing AIG, including documents that contained communications from the
law firm to AIG’s claim representatives.86
Based on the court’s previous statement that the attorney-client privilege applies to only client communications, the court of common pleas
ordered AIG to “serve on the trial judge a detailed statement of matters
complained of on appeal.”87 AIG filed the statement, claiming the prior
court abused its discretion by requiring AIG to disclose the documents.88
The court of common pleas, however, concluded that the attorney-client
81. For a further discussion of the facts in Gillard, see infra notes 84-95 and
accompanying text.
82. For a discussion of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Gillard and the complaints on appeal, see infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
83. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision
in Gillard, see infra notes 96-124 and accompanying text.
84. See Gillard, 15 A.3d at 46 (describing Pennsylvania supreme court’s purpose for accepting appeal).
85. See id. (noting specifics of underlying case involved bad-faith and breachof-contract claim). Because the parties settled the underlying claim for uninsured
motorist benefits, Gillard filed only the bad-faith claim against AIG. See Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the American Insurance Ass’n et al. at 8, Gillard, 15 A.3d
44 (No. 10 EAP 2010), 2010 WL 4969914 (describing claims at issue).
86. See Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., No. 0864, 2007 WL 2024787 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
June 5, 2007) (considering whether court abused its discretion by ordering disclosure of documents by AIG), aff’d, 947 A.2d 836 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (unpublished
table decision), rev’d, 15 A.3d 44.
87. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. See id. (noting two arguments offered by AIG). AIG’s two complaints
were: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring them to disclose the
communications from their attorney to the claims representatives and (2) that the
court erred or abused its discretion by including its ruling that the attorney-client
privilege is only a one-way street. See id.
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privilege protects only client-to-attorney communications.89 AIG ultimately appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the decision of the
court of common pleas.90 AIG then appealed to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, which granted the petition for appeal.91
On appeal, Gillard again claimed that AIG was not seeking limited,
derivative protection of an underlying client-to-attorney communication,
but rather the creation of a two-way street.92 Gillard argued that the court
should continue to “effectuate the will of the General Assembly” by holding that the privilege is a one-way street.93 In contrast, AIG noted that the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to protect and promote free exchange between attorney and client.94 In order to support this purpose,
AIG argued that the privilege must protect both attorney-to-client and client-to-attorney communications.95
B.

Lessons for PennDOT: How the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Paved the Two-Way Street

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that the superior court
adopted a “‘strictly limited’” view of the privilege, which was consistent
89. See id. (stating that policy reasons for attorney-client privilege do not warrant protection of attorney-to-client communications).
90. See Gillard, 947 A.2d 836, aff’g 2007 WL 2024787, rev’d, 15 A.3d 44.
91. See Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 990 A.2d 1147 (Pa. 2010) (per curiam) (granting Petition for Allowance of Appeal from decision of superior court to determine
scope of attorney-client privilege).
92. See Gillard, 15 A.3d at 46 (outlining Gillard’s argument that AIG was seeking unjustified expansion of attorney-client privilege). AIG’s argument focused on
the historical perspective of the privilege. See id. at 50. AIG claimed that narrowly
construing the privilege would “inhibit[ ] free and open communications” between clients and attorneys. See id. at 51. AIG pointed to the Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers for the notion that the privilege should cover all communications between attorneys and clients. See id. at 52 (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 (2000)). AIG stated they were seeking a “clear articulation from [the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania] endorsing the
broader approach to the privilege.” Id. at 53.
93. See id. at 47 (stating Gillard’s argument rested on premise that court
should not interfere with “truth-determining process”). Gillard conceded that
Pennsylvania recognizes derivative protection, but insisted it only covers comments
that would reveal previous communication from a client. See id. at 48. Further,
Gillard argued that the General Assembly intended a narrow approach to the privilege and thus the court should not “substitute its own policy.” See id. at 55 (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Gillard also argued that Earle was
not relevant and had been displaced because it had not been cited in 110 years
and also because the legislature re-enacted the attorney-client privilege statute in
1976. See id. Moreover, Gillard pointed to several decisions of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania that have construed the privilege narrowly. See id. at 56.
94. See id. at 47 (noting AIG emphasized underlying purpose of attorney-client privilege).
95. See id. (providing that AIG’s argument required broad interpretation of
attorney-client privilege). For a further discussion of AIG’s argument, see supra
note 92 and accompanying text.
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with the Superior Court’s previous decision in Fleming.96 Further, it acknowledged that the superior court entered its decision in Gillard before
the supreme court affirmed the decision in Fleming.97 However, the court
later said that the Opinion in Support of Affirmance from its decision in
Fleming did not solve the “tension” that existed between a broad interpretation of the privilege and the narrow focus of the statute.98 Additionally,
the court noted that the opinion supporting reversal in Fleming stated a
“‘narrow approach to the attorney-client privilege rigidly centered on the
identification of specific client communications’ was unworkable” because
communications between an attorney and client are “‘often inextricably
intermixed.’”99
The Pennsylvania supreme court acknowledged that Pennsylvania
courts were inconsistent when discussing the scope of the attorney-client
privilege.100 Additionally, the court noted that Pennsylvania, like other
jurisdictions, adopted a derivative protection approach to the privilege because of the difficulty in separating attorney advice from client input.101
The court further stated it was not clear that the General Assembly intended to impose strict restrictions on derivative protection.102 The majority dismissed the dissent’s argument that an expansion of the privilege
would be an act of judicial legislation, noting that Pennsylvania appellate
courts “consistently recognized the need” for such protection and that it
would be impossible to interpret the statute literally and still fulfill its intended purpose.103
96. See Gillard, 15 A.3d at 48 (quoting Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., No. 1065 EDA
2007, slip op. at 4, (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2011)) (noting Superior Court of Pennsylvania recognized derivative protection for attorney-to-client communications).
Despite the superior court’s recognition of the derivative protection, the supreme
court noted that the superior court limited the extension to attorney-to-client communications that would reveal confidential communications originally made by
the client. See id.
97. See id. at 49 (implying superior court might have decided Gillard differently had supreme court decided Fleming earlier).
98. See id. (stating lead opinion in Fleming found attorney-client privilege was
waived). For a further discussion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision
in Fleming, see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
99. Gillard, 15 A.3d at 49 (quoting Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fleming, 992
A.2d 65, 71 (Pa. 2010) (Saylor, J., in support of reversal)).
100. See id. at 57 (stating “disharmony” is created because of “competing interests-of-justice factors in playnamelythe encouragement of trust and candid communication between lawyers and their clients and the accessibility of material
evidence to further the truth-determining process” (citation omitted)).
101. See id. (noting that courts in all jurisdictions, including U.S. Supreme
Court, now recognize derivative protection under attorney-client privilege).
102. See id. at 58 (stating legislature most likely did not intend courts to make
“ ‘surgical separations’ ” (quoting Spectrum Sys. Int’l Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 581
N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (N.Y. 1991))).
103. See id. at 57-58 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (asserting that dissent recognized attorney-client privilege statute cannot be read literally and still give effect to its purpose).
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Further, the court stated that to determine the proper scope of the
privilege, it must look to the privilege’s underlying purpose: to promote
open and candid communication between attorneys and clients.104 The
court asserted that the legislature did not intend courts to perform “‘surgical separations’” of attorney and client communications.105 Additionally,
the court agreed with amici that it has authority to determine the proper
scope of such privileges under Pennsylvania’s constitution.106 While the
court acknowledged that an expanded attorney-client privilege could lead
to abuse of the privilege, it stated that the existing limitations were “sufficient to provide the essential checks.”107 Thus, the court held that the
attorney-client privilege is a two-way street that protects both client-to-attorney and attorney-to-client communications.108
Two justices filed separate dissenting opinions.109 Justice Eakin did
not agree with the majority’s assertion that a separate “blanket” protection
exists under the statute.110 He stated that the majority’s decision was
“well-reasoned,” but argued that the extension of the privilege was too
broad.111 Additionally, he noted that the attorney-client privilege “is a
104. See id. at 58 (noting that looking to statute’s purpose is “consistent with
logic and established principles of statutory construction”).
105. Id. (quoting Spectrum, 581 N.E.2d at 1060).
106. See id. (agreeing with amici that court has power beyond construction of
statutes, but declining to determine scope of this power because it was beyond
opinion).
107. See id. at 52 n.8, 58 (explaining that privilege protects communications
regarding legal advice). The court referred to the “ ‘ruse abuse’ ” as an example of
the feared abuse of the privilege. See id. at 58 (citing Sisk & Abbate, supra note 43,
at 230-35). The fear associated with the ruse abuse stems from the potential that
an expanded attorney-client privilege, covering communications with in-house
counsel, would allow corporations to funnel important company documents
through their in-house counsel in order to claim protection under the attorneyclient privilege. See Sisk & Abbate, supra note 43, at 231 (describing ruse abuse).
However, according to Sisk and Abbate, “[c]ourts understandably and appropriately refuse to accept the expediency of copying the lawyer on routine business
correspondence and memoranda as sufficient to raise the shield of privilege over
the entire content of such ordinary business documents.” Id. at 232. Further, they
concluded that the current requirements for the privilege are sufficient to prevent
abuse, and courts do not need to narrowly confine the scope of the privilege. See
id. at 232-33.
108. See Gillard, 15 A.3d at 59 (declaring privilege is limited to protect communications providing “professional legal advice”).
109. See id. (providing that four justices joined main opinion, while Justices
Eakin and McCaffery filed dissenting opinions).
110. See id. (Eakin, J., dissenting) (agreeing attorney-client privilege has derivative protection for attorney-to-client communication, but that it does not cover
situations where such communication does not reveal information communicated
by client and is “relevant to the legal rights at issue in a separate and distinct
action”).
111. See id. at 59-60 (claiming broad privilege denies fact finder access to evidence that could be relevant). Justice Eakin used an example where an attorney
tells a client that there is “no legal basis” for denying an insurance claim or for
withholding payment, but the client refuses to pay “until . . . made to do so.” See id.
at 60. He explained that the client’s reply would be privileged, but expressed that
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limited evidentiary privilege, and privileges are exceptions to normal evidentiary concepts and rules.”112 He further claimed that the statute is
worded unambiguously and thus the court must interpret it according to
its plain language.113 Because the evidentiary privileges are narrow and
the language of the statute is clear, he asserted that the majority’s construction of the privilege was improper.114 In addition, he stated that if
the privilege were to be expanded, it may be done either by the court
“after publication and comment” of the case or by the General Assembly
through statutory amendment.115
In the second dissent, Justice McCaffery asserted that the majority “acted in a legislative capacity.”116 He also claimed that the language in the
statute is clear and only protects communications from clients to attorneys.117 The justice acknowledged the derivative protection provided to
attorney communications, but only to the extent it protects communication originating with the client.118 He argued that the majority essentially
removed the requirements of the statute by extending the privilege to
he did not see why the attorney’s original communication should be privileged.
See id. He stated it is assumed that if the client does not pay, it is because the
attorney gave the client legal advice when there was no requirement to do so. See
id. The communication from the attorney would show that the client did not act
in good faith, but Justice Eakin questioned whether the client could “still assert
good faith while hiding this fact under a claim of privilege.” Id.
112. Id. at 60. Justice Eakin cited a previous decision in which the court asserted that the privilege must be strictly construed and applied “ ‘only to the very
limited extent that . . . excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending
the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining
truth.’ ” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Spetzer, 813 A.2d 707, 717 (Pa. 2002)).
Additionally, other courts recognized that the privilege is limited and should be
narrowly construed. See, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 600 (N.D. Tex.
1981) (acknowledging that privilege is exception to rule of “entitlement to every
man’s evidence” and it should only be construed to achieve its purposes); In re
Selser, 105 A.2d 395, 405 (N.J. 1954) (“[T]he privilege is not absolute, but rather
an exception to a more fundamental policy.”).
113. See Gillard, 15 A.3d at 60 (Eakin, J., dissenting) (asserting that 1 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1921(b) (2006) requires court to interpret statute based on text and
not on spirit). For a further discussion of the requirements of § 1921, see infra
notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
114. See Gillard, 15 A.3d at 60 (Eakin, J., dissenting) (acknowledging arguments made for expanding privilege, but denying that majority’s approach is appropriate way to facilitate such expansion).
115. See id. at 60-61 (arguing that there are more appropriate alternative avenues available to expand attorney-client privilege).
116. Id. at 61 (McCaffery, J., dissenting). Justice McCaffery continues: “[T]he
majority reads a provision not enacted by the General Assembly into the Pennsylvania attorney-client privilege statute.” Id.
117. See id. (referencing several Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decisions asserting that attorney-client privilege protects only client-to-attorney
communications).
118. See id. (stating Pennsylvania courts have recognized need for derivative
protection of attorney-to-client communication when it protects communications
originating with client).
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cover all attorney-to-client communications.119 Further, he dismissed the
majority’s claim that interpretations of the statute by Pennsylvania courts
were “inconsistent,” instead claiming there was little disagreement among
those courts.120
Additionally, the Justice McCaffery asserted that the language of the
statute made it clear that the legislature intended a strict construction of
the statute.121 Thus, he claimed that the majority’s expansion of the privilege’s scope violated the rules of statutory construction in Pennsylvania,
including the requirement to give meaning to the plain language of an
unambiguous statute.122 Further, he dismissed the majority’s assertion
that by acknowledging the derivative protection he recognized a “material
ambiguity” in the statute.123 Thus, he concluded that the court should
have affirmed the decision of the superior court because, among other
reasons, the majority’s decision was not consistent with the statutory
text.124
119. See id. at 62 (“Here, the majority ignores the plain text of the statute and
decades of decisional law faithful to that statutory text to hold that the privilege
operates in a ‘two-way fashion’ . . . .”).
120. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (arguing that sentences from
prior Pennsylvania decisions taken “out of context” support expansion, but that
closer examination reveals “little inconsistency or disharmony in judicial understanding or application of the attorney-client privilege”).
121. See id. at 63 (declaring he is “perplexed” how majority concluded legislature did not intend courts to strictly construe statute). Justice McCaffery cited the
statutory language that “ ‘counsel shall not be competent or permitted to testify to
confidential communications made to him by his client, nor shall the client be
compelled to disclose the same.’ ” Id. (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5928 (2011)).
He claimed the language of the statute is “unmistakably clear” that it only covers
client-to-attorney to communications. See id.
122. See id. (explaining that rules of statutory construction require court to
give meaning to “the text and the letter of the statute”). Justice McCaffery acknowledged the majority’s assertion that statutory interpretation can often require
courts to make assumptions about the legislature’s intent. See id. at 64. However,
he stated that under rules of statutory construction, the “occasion and necessity for
a statute’s enactment are to be considered only when the words of a statute are not
explicit.” Id. For a further discussion of § 1921, see infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
123. See Gillard, 15 A.3d at 64 (McCaffery, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (asserting that court has long recognized derivative protection,
which is not comparable to expansion of attorney-client privilege authorized by
majority). Justice McCaffery claimed that the derivative protection is necessary because, otherwise, an attorney could simply restate or write down the client’s communications and they would not be protected. See id. Thus, he argued that
recognizing the derivative protection is consistent with the privilege because not
protecting such communications “would render the statute absurd.” See id. Further, he asserted that recognizing the derivative protection is not equivalent to the
broad expansion of the majority or to recognizing “ ‘material ambiguity’ ” in the
statute. See id.
124. See id. (dissenting from majority’s expansion of attorney-client privilege).
Justice McCaffery also concluded that the work product doctrine addresses the
policy concerns of amici. See id. He noted that the Pennsylvania provisions of the
work product doctrine state “ ‘discovery shall not include disclosure of the mental
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THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA ACTED WITHIN ITS AUTHORITY
WHEN “PAVING” THE TWO-WAY STREET

In declaring that the attorney-client privilege is a two-way street, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Gillard was consistent with
principles of statutory construction and the Pennsylvania constitution.125
Despite the dissenters’ contention, the majority in Gillard concluded that
the attorney-client privilege statutes were ambiguous, and thus the court
was justified in reviewing past cases and the potential consequences of a
narrow interpretation of the statute.126 Further, the Pennsylvania constitution grants the supreme court authority to govern rules of procedure in
the courts of the Commonwealth.127
A.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Acted Within Its Statutory Authority

The attorney-client privilege was first given statutory force in Pennsylvania in the late nineteenth century.128 However, courts in the Commonwealth recognized the privilege long before its 1887 enactment.129 In
fact, even before the original codification, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that communications between an attorney and client are
sacred.130 The General Assembly was presumably aware of this history
when it re-codified the privilege in 1976, and by choosing not to substantively change the statute, they acquiesced in the court’s prior
interpretations.131
impressions of a party’s attorney or his or her conclusions, opinions, memoranda,
notes or summaries, legal research or legal theories.’ ” Id. (quoting PA. R. CIV. P.
4003.3). Despite agreeing with the majority that the scope of the work product
doctrine was beyond the scope of the case, he stated, “I cannot accept the majority’s assertion that its two-way reading of the attorney-client privilege does not totally encompass, and essentially render redundant, the work-product privilege
merely based on the latter’s limited application to materials prepared in anticipation of litigation.” Id.
125. For a discussion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Gillard and its consistency with principles of statutory construction and the Pennsylvania constitution, see infra notes 128-55 and accompanying text.
126. For a discussion of how the Gillard decision is consistent with principles
of statutory construction in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 128-45 and accompanying
text.
127. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s authority under the Pennsylvania constitution to prescribe rules of procedure in the
Commonwealth, see infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
128. Act of May 23, 1887, § 5(d), 1887 Pa. Laws 158, 159 (codified as
amended at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5928 (2011)).
129. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Noll, 662 A.2d 1123, 1126 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (noting that Pennsylvania has recognized attorney-client privilege since its
founding as colony). For a further discussion of the history of the attorney-client
privilege in Pennsylvania, see supra notes 52-80 and accompanying text.
130. See Moore v. Bray, 10 Pa. 519, 524 (Pa. 1849) (providing that all professional communications are sacred and person contesting applicability of privilege
has burden to show communications should not be protected).
131. For a discussion of the impact of precedent on the interpretation of General Assembly statutes, see infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
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According to Justice Eakin’s dissent in Gillard, the language of the
attorney-client privilege statutes in Pennsylvania is clear, and the majority
should have therefore applied the language of the statute.132 In Pennsylvania, courts must construe statutes to give meaning to the intention of
the General Assembly.133 When courts consider the words of the statute
to be clear, the “letter of [the statute] is not to be disregarded.”134 However, when the statute is not clear, a court may consider other factors when
attempting to determine the statute’s meaning.135 In addition, a presumption exists that “when a court of last resort has construed the language used in a statute, the General Assembly in subsequent statutes on
the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon
such language.”136
Despite the dissenters’ contentions, a review of attorney-client privilege decisions by Pennsylvania courts reveals confusion over the scope of
the privilege.137 Thus, under Pennsylvania law it was appropriate for the
court to consider other sources to determine the intention of the General
Assembly because the majority concluded that the attorney-client privilege
statute was not clear.138 Pennsylvania statutes allow a court interpreting
132. See Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44, 60 (Pa. 2011) (Eakin, J., dissenting) (noting language of attorney-client privilege statutes is unambiguous and
“clear and free from all ambiguity”). For a further discussion of the dissenting
opinions in Gillard, see supra notes 109-24 and accompanying text.
133. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(a) (“The object of all interpretation and
construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General
Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its
provisions.”).
134. Id. § 1921(b).
135. See id. § 1921(c) (providing factors to discern statute’s meaning). Section 1921(c) states:
When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same
or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
Id.
136. Id. § 1922(4). The purpose of § 1922 is to assist courts in determining
the intention of the General Assembly. See id. § 1922.
137. See Harrisburg Auth. v. CIT Capital USA, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 2d 380, 38687 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (acknowledging different interpretations regarding scope of
attorney-client privilege); see also Amici Curiae Brief of the Ass’n of Corporate
Counsel et al., supra note 71, at 21-22 (arguing superior court’s approach would
create uncertainty because it would cause undertaking of “difficult and fact-intensive inquiry”).
138. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(c) (providing sources courts can consider
to determine General Assembly’s intention when statutory language is not clear).
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unclear statutory language to consider, among other factors, any former
law and any potential consequences of the interpretation.139 Thus, assuming the majority was correct in determining that the statutory language was
unclear, it was appropriate for the court to consider the “‘inordinate practical difficulties’ which would flow from a strict approach to derivative
protection.”140
Additionally, when the General Assembly re-enacted the statute in
1976, it was substantially the same as the 1887 statute.141 Thus, the General Assembly was presumably aware of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s broad protection of the attorney-client privilege in Earle.142
Therefore, it was also appropriate for the court to consider Earle when
determining the scope of the privilege.143 Moreover, when a court of last
resort has interpreted a statute, the General Assembly is deemed to have
intended that the same construction apply to the new statute unless otherwise stated.144 Because the supreme court concluded that the statutory
language was unclear, it was necessary for the court to consider its prior
decisions construing the attorney-client privilege and any potential consequences of a narrow interpretation.145
For a further discussion of standards of statutory construction in Pennsylvania, see
supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
139. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(c)(5) (indicating “former law” as proper
consideration when statute is ambiguous).
140. Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44, 58 (Pa. 2011) (quoting Spectrum Sys.
Int’l Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (N.Y. 1991)). Additionally, the
majority refuted Justice McCaffery’s claim that the court was legislating, reasoning
that the recognition of the derivative protection shows that it is not possible to
both interpret the statute literally and effectuate meaning to its intended purpose.
See id. at 57-58. The majority considered Justice McCaffery’s differing view as to
whether the statute should cover attorney-to-client communications “as one of degree rather than direction.” See id. at 58.
141. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5928 official cmt. (West 2011) (noting privilege is “substantially a reenactment” of 1887 act).
142. See Amici Curiae Brief of the Ass’n of Corporate Counsel et al., supra
note 71, at 14 (asserting that consistent language in 1976 statute to that of 1887
statutein place at time of Earlecreated “a strong presumption” that General Assembly agreed with court’s opinion in Earle). For a discussion of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania’s decision in Earle, see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
143. See Gillard, 15 A.3d at 57 (noting Earle “dovetails” with court’s interpretation of attorney-client privilege). The court stated that the language of § 1922(4)
“may be regarded as somewhat of a fiction.” Id. However, it noted that “statutory
construction frequently entails resort to necessary, legitimate, and expressly authorized assumptions about legislative purpose.” Id.
144. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1922(4) (providing that General Assembly is
deemed to be aware of previous court decisions interpreting statutory language).
For a further discussion of standards of statutory construction in Pennsylvania, see
supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
145. See generally 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921 (setting standards for interpreting
intent of Pennsylvania General Assembly). For a discussion of the authority of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to broaden the statutory interpretation of the attorney-client privilege, see supra notes 128-44 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Has Authority Under the Pennsylvania
Constitution to Define the Scope of the Privilege

The Pennsylvania constitution grants the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania the authority to create rules “governing practice, procedure and
the conduct of all courts.”146 This is an exclusive grant of authority to the
court and the legislature can neither take it away nor interfere with it.147
Accordingly, the supreme court must find that a statute is procedural,
rather than substantive, in nature to determine whether the statute interferes with the court’s power.148
In Gillard, the supreme court stated that it has authority, under the
Pennsylvania constitution, to determine “the appropriate scope of testimonial privileges.”149 In addition, section 42 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes (“Judiciary and Judicial Procedure”) codifies the attorneyclient privilege.150 While the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has acknowledged the difficulty in determining whether a law is substantive or procedural, the court’s conclusion that it has the authority to determine the
scope of the attorney-client privilege and the inclusion of the privilege in
section 42 both indicate that the privilege is procedural.151
At least one judge asserted that the Pennsylvania supreme court does
not have the power to determine the scope of the attorney-client privilege
because it has “repeatedly and specifically affirmed the legislature’s authority to codify [the] privileges.”152 However, amici supporting an expansive view of the privilege pointed to the Pennsylvania supreme court’s
146. PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c). The provision goes on to state that “[a]ll laws
shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed
under these provisions.”
147. See In re 42 Pa. C. S. § 1703, 394 A.2d 444, 446 (Pa. 1978) (explaining
that Pennsylvania constitution explicitly assigns judiciary power “ ‘to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts’ ” (quoting
PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c))); Bergdoll v. Kane, 694 A.2d 1155, 1158 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1997) (acknowledging article V, § 10(c) of Pennsylvania constitution grants
“exclusive authority” to Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to establish rules over
practice and procedure).
148. See Commonwealth v. Morris, 771 A.2d 721, 737-38 (Pa. 2001) (noting
under article V, section 10, court has rulemaking authority over procedural law,
but not substantive law); Commonwealth v. Fowler, 304 A.2d 124, 127 (Pa. 1973)
(providing that court’s rulemaking power is limited to defining rules of procedure
rather than creating new substantive rights).
149. Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44, 58 (Pa. 2011).
150. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5916 (codifying attorney-client privilege in
Pennsylvania for criminal matters); id. § 5928 (codifying privilege for civil
matters).
151. See Morris, 771 A.2d at 738 (asserting that it is difficult to differentiate
between substantive and procedural laws, but recognizing that doing so is “necessary to answer a separation of powers question”).
152. Kolar v. Preferred Unlimited, Inc., 14 Pa. D. & C.5th 166, 170 (Pa. Ct.
Com. Pl. 2010). Judge Bernstein continues: “By abdicating the codification of privileges, the Supreme Court has deferred the value laden decisions as to what is
privileged to the legislative process.” Id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-2\VLR204.txt

382

unknown

Seq: 26

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

6-AUG-12

12:34

[Vol. 57: p. 357

citation of article V of the Pennsylvania constitution as the authority under
which the court acted to adopt the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence.153
Further, the General Assembly does not have the authority to override the
court’s power to determine the scope of the attorney-client privilege because of the court’s constitutional powers to create procedural rules.154
Because the attorney-client privilege is a procedural rule, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has the authority under article V of the Pennsylvania constitution to determine the appropriate scope of the
privilege.155
VI. THE TWO-WAY STREET ALLOWS THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
ACHIEVE ITS INTENDED PURPOSE

TO

The Pennsylvania supreme court’s creation of the two-way street supports the privilege’s purpose of encouraging communication between clients and attorneys.156 The legal community has generally responded
positively to the court’s decision in Gillard and indicated that the decision
clears up decades of confusion.157 Several scholars have claimed that the
expansion will lead to abuse of the privilege, but as the court noted, the
current limitations on the privilege will be adequate to prevent such
abuse.158
A.

Creating a Smooth Road Surface: Extension of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Is Consistent with Its Intended Purpose

The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to enhance the relationship between attorney and client and improve the quality of legal ser153. See Amici Curiae Brief of the Ass’n of Corporate Counsel et al., supra
note 71, at 16 (noting Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cited article V of Pennsylvania constitution as authority to enact rules of evidence and chose to leave
statutory scheme in place for evidentiary privilege). Further, amici argued that the
court presumably left the statutory scheme in place because it was aware of its
attorney-client privilege precedent, similar to their assertion that the General Assembly was aware of the Earle decision when it re-codified the attorney-client privilege statute. See id.
154. See id. (stating Pennsylvania supreme court’s authority to interpret scope
of evidentiary privileges “transcends” General Assembly’s ability to legislate these
privileges). For a further discussion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s power
to dictate procedural rules, see supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
155. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c) (granting authority to supreme court to
define certain procedural rules). For a further discussion of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania’s authority to define the scope of the attorney-client privilege in
Pennsylvania, see supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
156. For a discussion of how the decision in Gillard advances the underlying
purpose of the attorney-client privilege, see infra notes 159-72 and accompanying
text.
157. For a discussion of the legal community’s reaction to the decision in
Gillard, see infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
158. For a discussion of how the current limitations on the attorney-client
privilege are adequate to prevent future abuse, see infra notes 178-87 and accompanying text.
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vices provided to clients.159 Prior to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s
decision in Gillard, the attorney-client privilege in Pennsylvania protected
client-to-attorney communications and provided limited derivative protection for communications from attorneys to clients.160 However, this interpretation created uncertainty in Pennsylvania regarding how courts would
apply the privilege.161 As the U.S. Supreme Court stated, when the privilege lacks certainty, it “is little better than no privilege at all.”162
Previous attempts by Pennsylvania courts to limit the privilege to—at
most—a derivative protection of attorney-to-client communications risked
creating practical difficulties for those applying the privilege.163 Furthermore, uncertainty in the scope of the privilege can create a “significant
degree of injustice.”164 In its decision in Gillard, the supreme court acknowledged the difficulties with the current scope of the privilege and
“the need for greater certainty to encourage the desired frankness.”165
159. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (2000)
(“The rationale for the privilege is that confidentiality enhances the value of clientlawyer communications and hence the efficacy of legal services.”). For a further
discussion of the purpose of the attorney-client privilege, see supra notes 26-33 and
accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fleming, 924 A.2d 1259, 1264 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2007) (asserting attorney-client privilege statute only protects communications from clients, but acknowledging that derivative protection applies if communications would reveal communications originating with clients), aff’d on other
grounds, 992 A.2d 65 (Pa. 2010) (per curiam). For a further discussion of the attorney-client privilege in Pennsylvania prior to the decision in Gillard, see supra notes
52-80 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Fleming, 992 A.2d at 73 (Saylor, J., in support of reversal)
(describing uncertainty created by narrow construction of privilege). For a further
discussion of the confusion caused by the narrow construction of the attorneyclient privilege in Pennsylvania, see supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
162. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). For a further
discussion of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Upjohn, see supra notes
44-45 and accompanying text.
163. See Spectrum Sys. Int’l Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (N.Y.
1991) (providing that narrow construction of attorney-client privilege causes difficulties and renders attorneys unable to participate in fact gathering). The New
York court noted that prior to its decision the privilege was not limited to “repetition of confidences that were supplied to the lawyer by the client.” Id. The
“cramped view” that the court rejected is similar to the interpretation of the attorney-client privilege in Pennsylvania prior to Gillard. See id.; cf. Slusaw v. Hoffman,
861 A.2d 269, 273 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (explaining that attorney-client privilege
protects attorney-to-client communications to extent they would reveal communication initially disclosed by client).
164. Giesel, supra note 46, at 1217. Giesel addressed the uncertainty of the
attorney-client privilege in the corporate context. See id. at 1170. Giesel noted that
in order for the attorney-client privilege to have a degree of certainty, it must have
a set rule and not be determined on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 1187. She asserted that a balancing approach causes uncertainty for attorneys and clients over
whether a court will find that the “benefits of the privilege outweigh the burdens.”
Id. Giesel concluded that to achieve client candor, courts must create certainty in
the attorney-client privilege, without which the privilege will become a “mass of
confusion providing fertile ground for expensive corollary litigation.” Id. at 1218.
165. Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44, 57 (Pa. 2011).
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Thus, the supreme court recognized the need to bring the privilege in line
with its intended purpose.166
Generally, commentators have agreed that attorney-to-client communications will often reveal previous communications made by the client to
the attorney.167 Nevertheless, not all commentators have agreed that expanding the privilege to cover attorney-to-client communications is necessary to fulfill the purpose of the privilege.168 Further, it is unclear if
clients would reveal less to their attorneys if such communications were
discoverable.169
However, the supreme court in Gillard stated that it was not possible
to facilitate open communication and provide a literal interpretation of
the Pennsylvania attorney-client privilege statutes.170 Additionally, commentators have argued that a “client cannot develop a trusting relationship with the lawyer if the client lives in fear that any minor digression
during a meeting with the lawyer may no longer be secret.”171 One court
166. See id. at 58 (noting court must consider underlying purpose of attorneyclient privilege in order to determine appropriate scope).
167. See Rice, supra note 31, at 976 (stating it is “roughly accurate” that communications by attorney will reveal or rely on content from communications
originating from client); cf. Sisk & Abbate, supra note 43, at 240 (asserting that
attorneys and clients need to be able to freely communicate under privilege that
“grant[s] a unified protection to the deliberations”).
168. See Imwinkelried & Amoroso, supra note 24, at 311-12 (concluding that
absent attorney-client privilege, there would still be communication and courts
should only expand privilege for “compelling reasons”); see also Rice, supra note 31,
at 1005 (determining that attorney-client privilege’s rapid expansion is based on
“abandonment” rather than “reevaluation” of its basic principles).
169. See Rice, supra note 31, at 974 (claiming there is no reason to believe that
clients would be less forthcoming in communications with attorneys if privilege
were not in place). Rice argued that extending the privilege to communications
“between” attorney and client is premised on a belief that candid communication
would not occur if such communication was not protected. See id. at 973-74. Rice
claimed such protection goes beyond the bounds of what is needed to encourage
open and candid communications. See id. at 974. Further, he claimed that expansion appeals to judges because most attorney communications rely on previous
client communications and it removes the need to successfully assert the privilege
twice to protect the communications. See id. at 976. Rice cautioned that such steps
occurred haphazardly and without courts’ consideration of potential implications.
See id. at 1005.
170. See Gillard, 15 A.3d at 58 (recognizing that “material ambiguity” exists in
Pennsylvania attorney-client privilege statute because of inability to both interpret
statute literally and effectuate its intended purpose).
171. Sisk & Abbate, supra note 43, at 223. Sisk and Abbate argued that as the
practice of law expands, so should the attorney-client privilege. See id. at 204.
They noted that currently, courts apply an approach that attempts to determine
whether the client sought “legal advice.” See id. at 220. They argued that it should
not be the norm that courts examine each statement in the communication, but
rather the communication as a whole to determine whether something is privileged. See id. at 223. This approach, the authors claimed, would allow lawyers to
“fully explore the matter[s]” and prevent parties from being forced to convey why
particular comments or words, which are but part of larger communication, “are
sufficiently connected to the objectives of the representation.” Id. at 223-24. The
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also noted that while the attorney-client privilege does restrict access to
evidence, courts cannot interpret it so narrowly as to counteract the purpose of the privilege.172
Although the legal community disagrees as to whether an expansive
view of the privilege is necessary, the reception to the court’s decision has
been overwhelmingly positive.173 The positive response confirms that
there was confusion concerning the scope of the attorney-client privilege.174 Commentators have stated that the approach taken by the court
will make the application of the privilege easier to understand and administer.175 As the court noted, communications between attorney and client
lack of such protections, they argued, would “reduce lawyers to amoral legal technicians and leave clients unable to call upon lawyers to assist in moral aspiration.”
Id. at 240.
172. See Lefta Assocs. v. Hurley, No. 1:09-CV-2487, 2011 WL 2456616, at *7
(M.D. Pa. June 16, 2011) (asserting that while privilege must be construed narrowly because it prevents access to truth, courts must be careful not to impede its
intended purpose).
173. See, e.g., Coleen M. Meehan et al., Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules Attorney-Client Privilege Is a Two-Way Street, LITIG. LAWFLASH (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
LLP, Phila., Pa.), Mar. 3, 2011, at 3, available at http://www.morganlewis.com/
index.cfm/publicationID/6edc3565-0eca-49a0-a313-1b91b3fe0b8e/fuseaction/
publication.detail (“Gillard alleviates the uncertainty previously created by the
Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Nationwide decision.”); Melissa J. Oretsky, AttorneyClient Privilege is a Two-Way Street in Pennsylvania, CLIENT ALERTS (Reed Smith LLP,
Phila., Pa.), Mar. 11, 2011, http://www.reedsmith.com/Attorney-Client-Privilegeis-a-Two-Way-Street-in-Pennsylvania-03-11-2011/ (noting Gillard ruling is significant
because it “broadly protects all communications between attorneys and their clients” and “allows both in-house and outside counsel to initiate important communications with their clients”); Pennsylvania Supreme Court Ruling Restores Guarantee of
Privilege Protection for In-house Counsel Communications, ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL
(Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.acc.com/aboutacc/newsroom/pressreleases/PA-Supreme-Court-Ruling.cfm (stating ruling is “a [v]ictory,” also noting that senior vice
president for Association of Corporate Counsel explained “ ‘[i]t is an appropriate
ruling, as it will allow corporate attorneys to do their jobs-–giving legal advice when
needed without the specter of disclosure to adversaries in litigation’ ”). But see Attorney-Client Privilege Now a Two-Way Street in Pennsylvania, ABRAHAMSEN, CONABOY &
ABRAHAMSEN, P.C., http://www.law-aca.com/white-papers/198-attorney-client-privilege-now-a-two-way-street-in-pennsylvania (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (“This decision strikes a blow to plaintiffs in bad faith cases, as often information in the files of
the underlying insurance defense counsel[‘s] file on the original claim is necessary
to support a claim that the insurer acted in bad faith in evaluating a claim.”).
174. See, e.g., Thomas G. Wilkinson, Jr. & Matthew N. Klebanoff, Pennsylvania’s
Attorney-Client Privilege Is Revived and Well: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision
in Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., COMMERCIAL LITIG. ALERT (Cozen O’Connor, Phila.,
Pa.), Mar. 1, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.cozen.com/admin/files/publications/Commercial_Lit_030111.pdf (noting Pennsylvania supreme court’s decision
in Gillard cleared up “lingering uncertainty that has existed in Pennsylvania regarding scope of the attorney-client privilege”).
175. See Amici Curiae Brief of the Ass’n of Corporate Counsel et al., supra
note 71, at 22 (citing 1 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND
THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 9 (5th ed. 2007)) (acknowledging that it is difficult
to apply superior court’s approach from Fleming, while also stating that “two-way
street” approach is easier to apply).
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are often “intermixed” and thus, to fulfill the purpose of the privilege, a
two-way street approach to the privilege is necessary.176 This elimination
of uncertainty will facilitate open communications between clients and attorneys and ultimately allow the attorney-client privilege to achieve its intended purpose.177
B.

Preventing Future Construction: Other Limitations on the Attorney-Client
Privilege Will Prevent Subsequent Abuse of the Privilege

The attorney-client privilege contains several limitations and exceptions that prevent the privilege from unduly burdening a fact finder’s ability to access evidence.178 Pennsylvania adopted several such limitations
that remain unaffected by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision
in Gillard.179 In fact, Gillard provides that “the existing practices, procedures, and limitations, including in camera judicial review and the boundaries ascribed to the privilege are sufficient to provide the essential checks”
on the attorney-client privilege.180
Nevertheless, some have stated that courts should narrowly construe
the language of the statute as part of a “sound policy judgment[ ]” by the
General Assembly.181 Arguably, the privilege’s expansion will “open the
flood gates to many in camera reviews of documents at the trial court level
to determine whether the communication amounts to . . . ‘advice, analysis
176. See Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44, 58 (Pa. 2011) (stating that consideration of purpose of attorney-client privilege is essential to determining its scope
and also noting that such consideration is consistent with Pennsylvania standards
of statutory construction).
177. See Giesel, supra note 46, at 1186 (asserting there must be degree of certainty about protection of communications to effectuate purpose of attorney-client
privilege); Sisk & Abbate, supra note 43, at 216 (explaining lawyer must have full
access to client information because such flow of information requires client’s
trust, which can only be obtained with guarantee of confidentiality).
178. See Giesel, supra note 46, at 1180 (indicating limitation of attorney-client
privilege: that it only protects communication, not underlying facts); Leslie, supra
note 26, at 35-36 (noting attorney-client privilege has several exceptions that seek
to limit its scope in order to “exclude as little evidence as possible”).
179. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chimel, 738 A.2d 406, 414 (Pa. 1999) (holding that in Pennsylvania, client cannot claim incompetent representation and later
claim attorney-client privilege to prevent former attorney’s response to charges);
In re Investigating Grand Jury of Phila. Cnty. No. 88-00-3503, 593 A.2d 402, 406
(Pa. 1991) (holding that attorney-client privilege cannot be used to aid in commission of crime or fraud); In re Search Warrant B-21778, 521 A.2d 422, 429-30 (Pa.
1987) (holding that, in Pennsylvania, lawyers cannot suppress evidence which they
have legal obligation to produce under claim of privilege); In re Condemnation by
City of Phila., 981 A.2d 391, 397 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) (holding presence of third
party during communication will usually negate privilege).
180. Gillard, 15 A.3d at 58 (citation omitted).
181. See Coregis Ins. Co. v. Law Offices of Carole F. Kafrissen, P.C., 186 F.
Supp. 2d 567, 569 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (asserting one-way street language of Pennsylvania statute, which does not provide protection to communications from attorneys to clients, is “not a matter of whim or oversight”).
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or opinion.’”182 Further, opponents of the two-way street have argued
that expanding the attorney-client privilege may lead to its abuse.183
Despite these concerns, at least one commentator has claimed that
“the traditional prerequisites for and exceptions to the attorney-client privilege are well-suited to exclude abusive applications.”184 Importantly, the
Gillard court noted that its decision did not eliminate the other restrictions currently in place on the attorney-client privilege in Pennsylvania.185
The privilege still only protects communication, not underlying facts; and
it only protects communications “for the purpose of securing or providing
professional legal services.”186 Because the current protections are adequate to prevent abuses of the attorney-client privilege, it is unlikely that
the court opened the floodgates for potential abuses of the attorney client
privilege moving forward.187
VII. CONCLUSION: PENNSYLVANIA COMPLETES A CONSTRUCTION PROJECT
BY ESTABLISHING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
AS A TWO-WAY STREET
The attorney-client privilege is a long recognized privilege dating
back to at least the Elizabethan Era in England.188 Recognized by Penn182. Brief for the Appellee at 16, Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 924 A.2d 1259 (Pa.
2007) (No. 1065 EDA 2007), 2007 WL 4936021.
183. See Gillard, 15 A.3d at 60 (Eakin, J., dissenting) (implying extension of
privilege will allow insurance companies to claim good faith, while preventing opposing litigants from obtaining evidence to contrary); Attorney-Client Privilege Now a
Two-Way Street in Pennsylvania, supra note 172 (claiming expansion of attorney-client privilege will prevent access to much-needed evidence by plaintiffs in insurance bad faith litigation).
184. Sisk and Abbate, supra note 43, at 232. Sisk and Abbate noted that the
privilege does not protect underlying facts and only protects communications
made to the attorney. See id. at 233. Additionally, the “pre-existing document”
rule of the attorney-client privilege only protects documents made specifically for
the purpose of communicating with one’s attorney. See id. The authors also acknowledged other limitations on the privilege, including the crime-fraud exception and the restriction against sharing the communication with third parties. See
id. at 234. Thus, the authors concluded that these limitations make it unnecessary
for courts to restrict the scope of the attorney-client privilege. See id.
185. See Gillard, 15 A.3d at 58 (“For the present, at least, we believe the existing practices, procedures, and limitations, including in camera judicial review
and the boundaries ascribed to the privilege are sufficient to provide the essential
checks.” (citation omitted)). For a further discussion of the limits of the attorneyclient privilege in Pennsylvania, see supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
186. Gillard, 15 A.3d at 52 n.8.
187. See Amici Curiae Brief of the Ass’n of Corporate Counsel et al., supra
note 71, at 10 n.5 (stating request for two-way interpretation of attorney-client privilege is not “an endorsement of any practice, either by outside or in-house counsel,
of failing to provide legitimate discovery through an overbroad interpretation of
the privilege”). But see Brief for the Appellee, supra note 182, at 16 (discussing
potential for abuse if courts broadly construe attorney-client privilege).
188. See Imwinkelried & Amoroso, supra note 24 (noting recognition of attorney-client privilege in English law as early as 1577). For a further discussion of the
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sylvania courts since the colony’s founding, the legislature statutorily codified the privilege in 1887.189 Since its original codification, and even
more so after its re-codification in 1976, Pennsylvania courts disagreed as
to whether the attorney-client privilege is a one-way or two-way street.190
As the Pennsylvania supreme court noted in Gillard, the disagreement
among commentators and courts focuses on the tension between encouraging open communication between attorneys and clients and the ability
of a fact finder to access material evidence.191
The conflicting decisions in Pennsylvania created confusion about
how the privilege should apply and made apparent the need for a decision
that provided certainty for its future application.192 The supreme court’s
decision in Gillard eliminated the proverbial construction of the privilege,
and created a two-way street that is easier to administer.193 Further, under
the Pennsylvania constitution and the principles of statutory construction,
the supreme court did not abuse its discretion by expanding the scope of
the attorney-client privilege.194 Additionally, the current limitations on
the privilege are adequate to prevent its abuse moving forward.195
The court’s decision has already had an impact on the interpretation
of the privilege, as evidenced by two cases decided by the Middle District
of Pennsylvania where the attorney-client privilege was held to be a twoway street.196 Additionally, the Pennsylvania legal community expressed
general history of the attorney-client privilege, see supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
189. See Commonwealth v. Noll, 662 A.2d 1123, 1126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
(discussing history of attorney-client privilege in Pennsylvania). For a further discussion of the history of the privilege in Pennsylvania, see supra notes 52-80 and
accompanying text.
190. See generally Gillard, 15 A.3d at 57 (noting inconsistency and “ongoing
tension” regarding interpretation of attorney-client privilege in Pennsylvania). For
a further discussion of the disagreement among Pennsylvania courts regarding the
scope of the attorney-client privilege, see supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
191. See Gillard, 15 A.3d at 56-57 (describing reasons for inconsistent interpretations of attorney-client privilege).
192. See id. at 57 (agreeing with need for certainty in privilege’s application in
order to “encourage the desired frankness” in communications between attorney
and client).
193. See id. at 59 (holding attorney-client privilege protects both client-to-attorney and attorney-to-client communications in Pennsylvania).
194. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c) (granting Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
authority to prescribe rules of procedure for courts); see also 1 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1921 (2011) (detailing requirements for determining intent of General Assembly
when interpreting Pennsylvania statutes). For a further discussion of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania’s article V authority and the requirements for interpreting
statutes in Pennsylvania, see supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
195. See Gillard, 15 A.3d at 58 (noting current limitations of privilege are sufficient to prevent abuse). For a further discussion of the limitations on the attorneyclient privilege in Pennsylvania, see supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
196. See Lefta Assocs. v. Hurley, No. 1:09-CV-2487, 2011 WL 2456616, at *6
(M.D. Pa. June 16, 2011) (describing Pennsylvania supreme court’s rejection of
narrow interpretation of attorney-client privilege); see also Verdetto v. State Farm
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both support and relief after the court’s decision, confirming that the decision was long overdue.197 Further, the attorney-client privilege in Pennsylvania is now able to operate toward its intended purpose—to fully
promote open communication between attorneys and clients.198 Where
the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation continues to struggle, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has succeeded: it completed a “road construction project” by confirming the attorney-client privilege is a two-way
street.199
Fire & Cas. Co., No. 3:10-cv-1917, 2011 WL 1485674, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2011)
(noting supreme court’s decision in Gillard protects both attorney-to-client and
client-to-attorney communications).
197. See, e.g., Gina Passarella, Attorney-Client Privilege a Two-Way Street, State Supreme Court Rules, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 25, 2011, at 1 (asserting that Gillard
decision brings Pennsylvania in line with other jurisdictions and also quoting
Duane Morris partner who claimed change would be “ ‘very beneficial’ ”). For a
further discussion of the legal community’s reaction to the supreme court’s decision in Gillard, see supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
198. See Slusaw v. Hoffman, 861 A.2d 269, 273 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (stating
purpose of attorney-client privilege is to encourage “a trusting and open dialogue”). For a further discussion of the purpose of the attorney-client privilege,
see supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
199. For further analysis and discussion of the benefits of the supreme court’s
decision in Gillard, see supra notes 81-188 and accompanying text.
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